Cisco Secure Firewall ASA Software and Cisco Secure FTD Software, CVE-2026-76418: on CISA's exploited list
The bottom line
Organisations running Cisco ASA or FTD with SSL VPN enabled and secondary authentication on any tunnel group must act; the CISA deadline was 1 November 2026. Check tunnel group configuration for secondary-authentication-server-group immediately, including DefaultWEBVPNGroup.
Free analysis report · 11 pagesCisco Secure Firewall ASA Software and Cisco Secure FTD Software, CVE-2026-76418: on CISA's exploited listThe same note as a document you can keep or forward: what the sources say, who is affected, and what to do first.Download the analysis report →At a glance
| Fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Product | Cisco Secure Firewall ASA Software and Cisco Secure FTD Software (CVE-2026-76418) |
| Severity | High: 8.6 (CVSS 3.1) |
| CISA | On its exploited list since 29 October 2026. Deadline for US federal agencies: 1 November 2026. |
| Chance of exploitation (EPSS) | 0.01, the estimated chance in the next 30 days, as at 2 November 2026 |
| Ransomware use | Not recorded by CISA. That is not the same as none. |
| Fixed in | No source we read names a fixed version |
| Who looks first | Administrators of Cisco ASA or FTD devices where the SSL remote access VPN login service is reachable from outside, and at least one tunnel group — including the DefaultWEBVPNGroup — has a secondary authentication server group configured. |
Does this apply to you?
| Question | If no | If yes |
|---|---|---|
| Do you run Cisco Secure Firewall ASA or FTD software? | Nothing to do for this CVE. | Check whether SSL remote access VPN is enabled. |
| Is SSL remote access VPN enabled on any interface of your ASA or FTD? | Not exposed to this vulnerability. | Check your tunnel group configuration. |
| Is secondary-authentication-server-group configured in any tunnel group, including DefaultWEBVPNGroup? | Not exposed to this vulnerability. | Check whether the login service is reachable from untrusted networks. |
| Is the SSL VPN login service reachable from untrusted or internet-facing networks? | Exposure is limited; still apply the update, but not immediately internet-critical. | Act now; the CISA deadline was 1 November 2026. |
What it is
An unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted request to the SSL VPN login service and force the firewall to reload, cutting off all traffic through it until it recovers. No account and no user action are needed. The record says the cause is a logic error when secondary authentication is configured on a tunnel group.
Why it matters
The CVSS score of 8.6 reflects no authentication and no user interaction, with the attack crossing a security boundary. The condition that triggers the flaw — secondary authentication on a tunnel group — is a security best practice, so well-secured deployments are more likely to be affected, not less. A successful attack takes the firewall offline. Our reading is that the zero-authentication requirement and network scope make this a priority for any organisation whose remote workforce depends on this VPN, regardless of how narrow the configuration condition appears.
What the vendor's advisory says
We read one page on sec.cloudapps.cisco.com. In short:
- The vendor's advisory (published 28 October 2026, Cisco Bug ID CSCwx26625) explicitly states no workarounds are available. Software updates are the only remediation.
- The advisory's CVSS score is 8.6 (High). The weakness is CWE-690, an unchecked return value to null pointer dereference.
Exposure by situation
These priorities are our judgement from what the sources say about who can use the flaw and how. They are not vendor ratings.
| Your situation | Priority | Timeframe |
|---|---|---|
| ASA or FTD with SSL VPN enabled, secondary auth on any tunnel group, login page internet-facing | High | Within CISA's window — deadline was 1 November 2026 |
| ASA or FTD with SSL VPN enabled, secondary auth on DefaultWEBVPNGroup even without tunnel-group-list | High | Within CISA's window — deadline was 1 November 2026 |
| ASA or FTD with SSL VPN and secondary auth, reachable only from trusted internal networks | Medium | This week |
| ASA or FTD with SSL VPN enabled but no secondary authentication configured on any tunnel group | Low | Next patch cycle |
| ASA or FTD without SSL VPN enabled on any interface | None | None for this CVE |
Things people will get wrong
- Removing the group list from the login page removes the risk. The vendor's advisory states that disabling tunnel-group-list does not remove exposure when DefaultWEBVPNGroup has secondary authentication configured. That default group must also be checked.
- Only tunnel groups shown on the login page need checking. The advisory explicitly states the check is not limited to profiles displayed in the group list. All tunnel groups, including hidden ones and the default, must be reviewed.
- The low EPSS score means exploitation is unlikely. CISA has added this to its known-exploited catalogue. The EPSS figure reflects statistical models; CISA's listing reflects observed exploitation in practice, which overrides the probability estimate.
How we would triage it
This is our judgement.
The commands only read: they print a version or list what is installed. They come from general knowledge of this kind of product, not from the sources, so check them against the vendor's page before you run them. Words in capitals are for you to fill in.
Step 1: Identify which devices run ASA or FTD
- Compile a list of all Cisco ASA and FTD devices in your estate, noting their software version and whether the SSL VPN service is enabled on any interface.
show version
show running-config webvpnStep 2: Check tunnel group configuration for secondary authentication
- On each device with SSL VPN enabled, check every tunnel group including DefaultWEBVPNGroup for secondary-authentication-server-group.
- The advisory says the check applies even when tunnel-group-list is disabled, because DefaultWEBVPNGroup remains active as the default and must be inspected separately.
show running-config tunnel-groupStep 3: Apply the vendor's software update
- The vendor's advisory states software updates have been released. Check the Fixed Software section of the advisory for the correct release for your ASA or FTD version train.
- There are no workarounds. If patching must be delayed, consider restricting access to the SSL VPN login service to trusted source addresses as a temporary measure.
Step 4: Verify and confirm the fix is in place
- After updating, re-run the configuration checks to confirm no tunnel group retains a vulnerable configuration, and verify the device version reflects the patched release.
To close it, read the version from the product itself, not from an old inventory, and save the output with the date. If you cannot update today, write down who owns it, the new date, and what limits exposure until then. CISA's wording adds that you should stop using the product if no mitigation is available.
Send this to your IT provider
Copy it, change the names and dates, and send it. It is a draft for you to check, not a template tested with any provider.
We have been made aware of CVE-2026-76418, a vulnerability in Cisco Secure Firewall ASA and FTD software. An unauthenticated attacker can crash the firewall by sending a crafted request to the SSL VPN login service when secondary authentication is configured on a tunnel group. The CISA remediation deadline was 1 November 2026. Could you please confirm: (1) whether we run any Cisco ASA or FTD devices with SSL VPN enabled; (2) if so, which software version each device is running; and (3) whether secondary authentication is configured on any tunnel group, including DefaultWEBVPNGroup? The vendor's advisory states software updates have been released. Please provide written confirmation of the version running on each affected device and whether the update has been applied or is scheduled, by 8 November 2026.
Signs it was used
An update closes the hole. It does not tell you whether someone used it first. CISA's required action points to its forensic triage requirements (BOD 26-04). Look for:
- Unexpected device reloads in the system log correlated in time with SSL VPN connection attempts.
- Malformed or unusual connection requests in the SSL VPN access log immediately before a reload event.
- Reload reason entries in the device's crash or system log pointing to a null pointer dereference in the VPN process.
The weakness behind it
The record classes this as CWE-690 (Unchecked Return Value to NULL Pointer Dereference).
Likely ATT&CK mapping
MITRE ATT&CK is a public catalogue of the steps attackers take, from getting in to causing damage. No source has mapped this flaw to it yet, so the steps below are our prediction from what the record says the flaw allows. They are not MITRE's, the vendor's or CISA's, and an attacker may do other things.
| The step, in plain words | Stage of an attack | Why we think so |
|---|---|---|
| Endpoint Denial of Service (T1499): Crashing or overloading a single system or application. | Impact: causing damage or disruption | The flaw causes an unexpected device reload from a single crafted SSL VPN request requiring no authentication — likely used to take the firewall offline and disrupt network defences. |
| Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190): Breaking in through a service that faces the internet, such as a web server, VPN or login page. | Initial Access: getting in | The SSL VPN login endpoint is internet-facing and exploitable without credentials; the logic error in secondary authentication handling would typically be reached by targeting a public-facing service. |
How to use this: ask your IT provider which control or log would show each step, for example whether sign-in attempts from the internet are recorded. If nobody can answer, that is the gap to close first.
MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. Technique names are MITRE's.
The sources, in their words
CISA's catalogue entry:
Cisco Secure Firewall ASA Software and Cisco Secure FTD Software contains an unchecked return value to NULL pointer dereference vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause the device to reload unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition.
The CVE record, published by Cisco on 28 October 2026:
A vulnerability in the Remote Access SSL VPN service of Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause the device to reload unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. This vulnerability is due to logic errors when secondary authentication is configured on a tunnel group. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted request when connecting to the SSL remote access VPN. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the affected device to reload, resulting in a DoS condition.
The record lists 142 affected versions or ranges of Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software. The first 8 are below; the rest are in the CVE record, so check your version against the whole list.
- 9.16.1
- 9.16.1.28
- 9.16.2
- 9.16.2.3
- 9.16.2.7
- 9.16.2.11
- 9.16.2.13
- 9.16.2.14
The record lists 67 affected versions or ranges of Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) Software. The first 8 are below; the rest are in the CVE record, so check your version against the whole list.
- 7.0.0
- 7.0.0.1
- 7.0.1
- 7.0.1.1
- 7.0.2
- 7.2.0
- 7.0.2.1
- 7.0.3
CISA's required action:
Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions.
Check your own project
If you build software, you can compare what a project declares with this CVE from a terminal. The tool reads requirements files, package.json, Maven, Gradle, Cargo, CMake and Dockerfile files, runs nothing, and only the CVE id leaves your machine. Naming the CVEs needs no key.
lattice-scan project . --cve CVE-2026-76418Each row says in-range, outside-range, undetermined or lead, with the file and line. That is evidence about what a manifest declares, not about what runs, and a person decides. The verdicts, the CSV columns and a pipeline recipe are in the guide.
Check the servers you run
The same id can be checked against a host. Run this on the machine itself, not on the laptop that deploys to it: it reads installed packages (dpkg, rpm or apk), snaps, the hardware, the running container images with their operating system and packages, and the kernel version, compares them on the spot, and only the CVE ids leave the machine; the inventory stays on it, in ~/.lattice-scan. Naming the CVEs needs no key. Do it on each server after a deployment, and again when a new entry lands.
lattice-scan --cve CVE-2026-76418A match is a candidate for a person to confirm, not a finding. A distribution can fix a CVE under an unchanged version number, so a match is a candidate; on Debian-family hosts the report also shows whether the package's own changelog names the CVE. It reads the names of the running images, not what is inside them; for what an image declares, use the project check on its Dockerfile.
Guide: namiq.io/lattice/guides/choose-your-channel. MCP server (io.namiq/lattice in the MCP registry): namiq.io/lattice. Package: pypi.org/project/lattice-scan, or namiq.io/apt.
- Which way into Lattice fits your job →The command line, the Claude skill or the MCP server: what each needs, what works without a key and how to read the result.
- Lattice, the MCP server →The public graph the command reads, for AI agents over MCP.
- Install and connect →The signed apt repository, the fingerprint, and the connection commands for each client.
What we do not know yet
- The provided advisory text does not state specific fixed version numbers for ASA or FTD; the advisory's Fixed Software section must be consulted directly.
- Whether an exploit attempt leaves log entries distinguishable from a routine device reload is not stated in the record.
- Recovery time and behaviour after an exploit-triggered reload is not stated.
- Whether the flaw affects ASA or FTD running as virtual instances is not confirmed in the available source text.
- We have not tested this against any environment. Versions and scores are as the sources state them and as at 2 November 2026; the vendor's advisory wins where it differs.
- The sections headed "The bottom line", "Does this apply to you?", "What it is", "Why it matters", "Likely ATT&CK mapping", "Exposure by situation", "Things people will get wrong", "How we would triage it" and "Send this to your IT provider" are our interpretation of the sources, not a statement by CISA or the vendor.