Fortinet Multiple Products, CVE-2025-61624: on CISA's exploited list
The bottom line
If you run FortiOS, FortiProxy, FortiPAM or FortiSwitchManager, act now: the CISA date has already passed. First find your version and who holds read-write admin accounts. If you run none of these, stop reading.
At a glance
| Fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Product | Fortinet Multiple Products (CVE-2025-61624) |
| Severity | Medium: 5.4 (CVSS 3.1) |
| CISA | On its exploited list since 16 October 2026. Deadline for US federal agencies: 19 October 2026. |
| Chance of exploitation (EPSS) | 0.01, the estimated chance in the next 30 days, as at 6 November 2026 |
| Ransomware use | Not recorded by CISA. That is not the same as none. |
| Fixed in | FortiOS 7.6.5, 7.4.10; FortiProxy 7.6.5, 7.4.12; FortiPAM 1.7.1; FortiSwitchManager 7.2.8, 7.0.7 (vendor advisory, 14 April 2026). Older branches: migrate to a fixed release. |
| Who looks first | Anyone running FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy or FortiSwitchManager, first where several people hold admin accounts or where admin logins can be reached from outside. |
Does this apply to you?
| Question | If no | If yes |
|---|---|---|
| Do you run FortiOS, FortiProxy, FortiPAM or FortiSwitchManager? | Nothing to do for this CVE. | Check the version (next question). |
| Is your version inside an affected range, or on 7.2, 7.0 or 6.4 (FortiOS), or FortiPAM 1.6 or older? | Nothing to do for this CVE. FortiPAM 1.8 is listed as not affected. | Plan the upgrade or migration now. |
| Can anyone besides trusted staff log in to the CLI with a read-write admin profile? | Exposure is lower, but still patch. | Remove or restrict those accounts today. |
| Is the admin login reachable from the internet or from untrusted networks? | Keep it that way while you patch. | Restrict it to a management network first. |
What it is
An attacker who is already logged in as an administrator with at least read-write permissions can use crafted CLI commands to write or delete files of their choosing on the device. The attacker needs that admin login first.
Why it matters
The vendor rates this Medium, but it is listed as exploited. Our reading is that a file write or delete on a security device is useful to an attacker who already holds admin access: it can change what the device does or remove traces. The record does not say what was written or deleted in attacks. A modest score is no reason to delay.
What the vendor's advisory says
We read one page on fortiguard.fortinet.com. In short:
- The vendor's advisory (FG-IR-26-122, 14 April 2026) rates it Medium, CVSSv3 6.0, attack type authenticated, and marks it as known exploited.
- It says FortiOS 7.2, 7.0 and 6.4 are affected in all versions, with no fixed release in those branches: the advice is to migrate.
- FortiPAM 1.6 and earlier are affected in all versions; FortiPAM 1.7.0 is fixed in 1.7.1; FortiPAM 1.8 is not affected.
- The advisory says a virtual patch is available in database update 25.120, for customers who use that service.
- The advisory points to the vendor's upgrade tool for the recommended upgrade path.
Exposure by situation
These priorities are our judgement from what the sources say about who can use the flaw and how. They are not vendor ratings.
| Your situation | Priority | Timeframe |
|---|---|---|
| Affected version with admin login reachable from the internet | High | Now; the CISA window has passed |
| Affected version, admin access only from a management network | High | Now; CISA lists it as exploited |
| FortiOS 7.2, 7.0 or 6.4 with no fixed release in the branch | High | Now; plan migration and tighten admin access |
| Fixed version already installed | Low | Confirm in writing; no further action |
| No Fortinet products in your estate | None | None for this CVE |
Things people will get wrong
- "Medium score, so it can wait." The vendor marks it as known exploited and CISA lists it. The score does not describe that.
- "It needs a login, so it is not our problem." The login needed is an admin with read-write rights. The record does not say how attackers get one, so check who holds such accounts.
- "Our FortiOS is old but stable, so we are fine." The advisory lists FortiOS 7.2, 7.0 and 6.4 as affected in all versions and says to migrate.
The wording includes conditions the score may not show: the attacker must be logged in. Read the record before you decide it does not apply to you.
How we would triage it
This is our judgement.
The commands only read: they print a version or list what is installed. They come from general knowledge of this kind of product, not from the sources, so check them against the vendor's page before you run them. Words in capitals are for you to fill in.
Step 1: Find the versions you run
- List every FortiOS, FortiProxy, FortiPAM and FortiSwitchManager device and its version.
- Compare each against the fixed versions: older branches have no fix in-branch.
get system statusStep 2: Reduce who can use the CLI
- List admin accounts and remove any read-write profile that is not needed, since the flaw needs one.
- Limit admin login to a management network and trusted addresses.
show system adminStep 3: Patch or migrate
- Upgrade to a fixed version, or migrate if your branch has none, using the vendor's upgrade path.
- If you cannot patch at once, ask whether the vendor's virtual patch (database update 25.120) applies to you.
Step 4: Check for signs of misuse
- Review admin logins and CLI activity for accounts or times you do not recognise.
- Look for files that were changed or are missing without a change request.
To close it, read the version from the product itself, not from an old inventory, and save the output with the date. If you cannot update today, write down who owns it, the new date, and what limits exposure until then.
Send this to your IT provider
Copy it, change the names and dates, and send it. It is a draft for you to check, not a template tested with any provider.
Hello. Please tell us whether we run FortiOS, FortiProxy, FortiPAM or FortiSwitchManager, and where. For each, please give the exact version. The vendor's advisory for CVE-2025-61624 lists fixed versions: FortiOS 7.6.5 or 7.4.10, FortiProxy 7.6.5 or 7.4.12, FortiPAM 1.7.1, FortiSwitchManager 7.2.8 or 7.0.7. Older branches need migration. CISA lists this flaw as exploited and its date has passed. Please also list who holds read-write admin accounts. Please confirm the version and the fix to us in writing by a date you propose this week. Thank you.
Signs it was used
An update closes the hole. It does not tell you whether someone used it first. CISA's required action points to its forensic triage requirements (BOD 26-04). Look for:
- Admin logins at unusual times or from addresses you do not recognise.
- CLI commands run by admin accounts that no one can account for.
- Files on the device that have changed or disappeared without a planned change.
The weakness behind it
The record classes this as CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory).
Likely ATT&CK mapping
MITRE ATT&CK is a public catalogue of the steps attackers take, from getting in to causing damage. No source has mapped this flaw to it yet, so the steps below are our prediction from what the record says the flaw allows. They are not MITRE's, the vendor's or CISA's, and an attacker may do other things.
| The step, in plain words | Stage of an attack | Why we think so |
|---|---|---|
| Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation (T1565.001): Changing stored data without permission. | Impact: causing damage or disruption | Path traversal via CLI commands would likely allow an authenticated admin to overwrite arbitrary files on the device, enabling stored data manipulation or configuration tampering. |
| Data Destruction (T1485): Deleting or overwriting data so it cannot be recovered. | Impact: causing damage or disruption | Write access to arbitrary files would typically enable destruction of logs or configuration, consistent with post-compromise cleanup or sabotage on network appliances. |
| Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068): Using a flaw to gain higher rights than the account had, such as administrator or root. | Privilege Escalation: gaining higher rights | Arbitrary file writes on a privileged network appliance would likely be used to escalate from limited admin access to full system control by overwriting binaries or boot configuration. |
How to use this: ask your IT provider which control or log would show each step, for example whether sign-in attempts from the internet are recorded. If nobody can answer, that is the gap to close first.
MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. Technique names are MITRE's.
The sources, in their words
CISA's catalogue entry:
FortiOS, FortiPAM, FortiProxy, and FortiSwitchManager contain a path traversal vulnerability that may allow an authenticated attacker with admin profile and at least read-write permissions to write or delete arbitrary files via specific CLI commands.
The CVE record, published by Fortinet on 14 April 2026:
An Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') [CWE-22] vulnerability in Fortinet FortiOS 7.6.0 through 7.6.4, FortiOS 7.4.0 through 7.4.9, FortiOS 7.2 all versions, FortiOS 7.0 all versions, FortiOS 6.4 all versions, FortiPAM 1.7.0, FortiPAM 1.6 all versions, FortiPAM 1.5 all versions, FortiPAM 1.4 all versions, FortiPAM 1.3 all versions, FortiPAM 1.2 all versions, FortiPAM 1.1 all versions, FortiPAM 1.0 all versions, FortiProxy 7.6.0 through 7.6.4, FortiProxy 7.4.0 through 7.4.11, FortiProxy 7.2 all versions, FortiProxy 7.0 all versions, FortiSwitchManager 7.2.0 through 7.2.7, FortiSwitchManager 7.0.0 through 7.0.6 may allow an authenticated attacker …
Versions of Fortinet FortiOS the record lists as affected:
- 7.6.0 through 7.6.4
- 7.4.0 through 7.4.9
- 7.2.0 through 7.2.13
- 7.0.0 through 7.0.19
- 6.4.0 through 6.4.16
Versions of Fortinet FortiProxy the record lists as affected:
- 7.6.0 through 7.6.4
- 7.4.0 through 7.4.11
- 7.2.0 through 7.2.16
- 7.0.0 through 7.0.23
Versions of Fortinet FortiSwitchManager the record lists as affected:
- 7.2.0 through 7.2.7
- 7.0.0 through 7.0.6
Versions of Fortinet FortiPAM the record lists as affected:
- 1.7.0
- 1.6.0 through 1.6.2
- 1.5.0 through 1.5.1
- 1.4.0 through 1.4.3
- 1.3.0 through 1.3.1
- 1.2.0
- 1.1.0 through 1.1.2
- 1.0.0 through 1.0.3
What the record says to do about it, in the vendor's words:
Upgrade to upcoming FortiOS version 8.0.0 or above Upgrade to FortiOS version 7.6.5 or above Upgrade to FortiOS version 7.4.10 or above Upgrade to FortiProxy version 7.6.5 or above Upgrade to FortiProxy version 7.4.12 or above Upgrade to FortiPAM version 1.8.0 or above Upgrade to FortiPAM version 1.7.1 or above Fortinet remediated this issue in FortiSASE version 25.4.b and hence customers do not need to perform any action. Upgrade to upcoming FortiSwitch version 8.0.0 or above Upgrade to FortiSwitch version 7.6.5 or above Upgrade to FortiSwitch version 7.4.9 or above Upgrade to FortiSwitchMana
CISA's required action:
Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes).
Check your own project
If you build software, you can compare what a project declares with this CVE from a terminal. The tool reads requirements files, package.json, Maven, Gradle, Cargo, CMake and Dockerfile files, runs nothing, and only the CVE id leaves your machine. Naming the CVEs needs no key.
lattice-scan project . --cve CVE-2025-61624Each row says in-range, outside-range, undetermined or lead, with the file and line. That is evidence about what a manifest declares, not about what runs, and a person decides. The verdicts, the CSV columns and a pipeline recipe are in the guide.
Check the servers you run
The same id can be checked against a host. Run this on the machine itself, not on the laptop that deploys to it: it reads installed packages (dpkg, rpm or apk), snaps, the hardware, the running container images with their operating system and packages, and the kernel version, compares them on the spot, and only the CVE ids leave the machine; the inventory stays on it, in ~/.lattice-scan. Naming the CVEs needs no key. Do it on each server after a deployment, and again when a new entry lands.
lattice-scan --cve CVE-2025-61624A match is a candidate for a person to confirm, not a finding. A distribution can fix a CVE under an unchanged version number, so a match is a candidate; on Debian-family hosts the report also shows whether the package's own changelog names the CVE. It reads the names of the running images, not what is inside them; for what an image declares, use the project check on its Dockerfile.
Guide: namiq.io/lattice/guides/choose-your-channel. MCP server (io.namiq/lattice in the MCP registry): namiq.io/lattice. Package: pypi.org/project/lattice-scan, or namiq.io/apt.
- Which way into Lattice fits your job →The command line, the Claude skill or the MCP server: what each needs, what works without a key and how to read the result.
- Lattice, the MCP server →The public graph the command reads, for AI agents over MCP.
- Install and connect →The signed apt repository, the fingerprint, and the connection commands for each client.
What we do not know yet
- Which files attackers wrote or deleted, and how they got the admin login, are not stated.
- No source names a fixed release for FortiOS 7.2, 7.0 or 6.4; the advice is only to migrate.
- The sources do not say whether the virtual patch fully blocks the flaw.
- The advisory says the flaw was found internally; the sources do not describe the attacks.
- We have not tested this against any environment. Versions and scores are as the sources state them and as at 6 November 2026; the vendor's advisory wins where it differs.
- The sections headed "The bottom line", "Does this apply to you?", "What it is", "Why it matters", "Likely ATT&CK mapping", "Exposure by situation", "Things people will get wrong", "How we would triage it" and "Send this to your IT provider" are our interpretation of the sources, not a statement by CISA or the vendor.