ISC BIND, CVE-2015-5477: on CISA's exploited list
The bottom line
If you run BIND as a DNS server, act now: CISA's deadline of 11 October 2026 has already passed. Check the version first. If you run no BIND, you can stop reading.
At a glance
| Fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Product | ISC BIND (CVE-2015-5477) |
| Severity | High: 7.5 (CVSS 3.1) |
| CISA | On its exploited list since 8 October 2026. Deadline for US federal agencies: 11 October 2026. |
| Chance of exploitation (EPSS) | 1.00, the estimated chance in the next 30 days, as at 6 November 2026 |
| Ransomware use | Not recorded by CISA. That is not the same as none. |
| Fixed in | No source we read names a fixed version |
| Who looks first | Anyone who runs ISC BIND as a DNS server, or whose IT provider does. Check name servers that answer queries from outside your network first. |
Does this apply to you?
| Question | If no | If yes |
|---|---|---|
| Do you or your IT provider run ISC BIND (named) on any server or appliance? | Nothing to do for this CVE. | Find the version (next question). |
| Is the BIND version inside the affected range shown on this page? | Nothing further for this CVE. Keep a note of the version. | Treat it as affected and update. |
| Can anyone outside your organisation send queries to that server? | Lower urgency, but still update. Internal users could cause an outage. | Update first, and limit who can query it. |
| Is the server a vendor appliance or a packaged build? | Update BIND from your operating system or ISC. | Ask the vendor for their fixed build in writing. |
What it is
A remote attacker can send specially crafted TKEY queries to the BIND name server (named). The record says this triggers an assertion failure and the daemon exits, so DNS stops answering until it is restarted.
Why it matters
The record gives a score of 7.5 and describes a denial of service only, not code execution or data theft. Our reading is that the use is taking down name resolution: when DNS stops, mail, web access and remote logins that depend on it fail too. Because CISA lists it as exploited, a name server that is reachable from the internet and not updated should be treated as a known target.
Exposure by situation
These priorities are our judgement from what the sources say about who can use the flaw and how. They are not vendor ratings.
| Your situation | Priority | Timeframe |
|---|---|---|
| A BIND server in the affected range answers queries from the internet | High | Now; CISA's deadline has passed |
| A BIND server in the affected range is reachable only from your internal network | Medium | This week |
| A router or appliance may embed BIND and the vendor has not said | Medium | This week, once the vendor replies |
| A BIND server outside the affected range | Low | Next patch cycle, record the version |
| You run no BIND | None | None for this CVE |
Things people will get wrong
- "It is only a denial of service, so it can wait." CISA lists it as exploited, and the record says the daemon exits. A stopped name server takes down everything that needs DNS.
- "The record is from 2015, so we must have patched it long ago." Age does not show a fix. Old servers and embedded builds can still be on affected versions, so check the version.
- "We would see an attack in our logs." The record does not say what a hit looks like. Do not rely on seeing it beforehand.
How we would triage it
This is our judgement.
The commands only read: they print a version or list what is installed. They come from general knowledge of this kind of product, not from the sources, so check them against the vendor's page before you run them. Words in capitals are for you to fill in.
Step 1: Find where BIND runs and which version
- Ask your IT provider for a list of DNS servers, including any inside routers or appliances.
- On each one, read the installed BIND version and compare it with the affected range on this page.
named -v
dpkg -l | grep -i bind9Step 2: Reduce exposure while you plan the update
- Allow queries only from the networks that need them. The record does not name a workaround, so this is general hygiene, not a fix.
- Make sure a restart of the named service is quick, because the record says the daemon exits.
Step 3: Update to a fixed build
- No source here names a fixed version. Ask the vendor or your operating system supplier which build fixes CVE-2015-5477, and install it.
- Follow CISA's required action for the forensics step as well.
Step 4: Confirm the result
- Re-read the version on each server after the update.
- Ask for written confirmation that every BIND instance is on the fixed build.
To close it, read the version from the product itself, not from an old inventory, and save the output with the date. If you cannot update today, write down who owns it, the new date, and what limits exposure until then.
Send this to your IT provider
Copy it, change the names and dates, and send it. It is a draft for you to check, not a template tested with any provider.
Hello. CISA lists CVE-2015-5477, a denial-of-service flaw in ISC BIND (named) triggered by TKEY queries. Please tell us whether we run BIND anywhere, including inside routers or appliances, and which version each one is. Please also confirm which build fixes this CVE for each system, and whether any server answers queries from the internet. If any is affected, please update it and send us written confirmation of the new version by the end of this week. CISA's deadline of 11 October 2026 has already passed. Thank you.
Signs it was used
An update closes the hole. It does not tell you whether someone used it first. CISA's required action points to its forensic triage requirements (BOD 26-04). Look for:
- Unexpected exits or restarts of the named service, particularly with an assertion message in its log.
- Gaps in DNS answers on the server at the times it stopped.
- Incoming TKEY queries from addresses you do not recognise, if your server logs query types.
The weakness behind it
CISA's entry classes this as CWE-19.
Likely ATT&CK mapping
MITRE ATT&CK is a public catalogue of the steps attackers take, from getting in to causing damage. No source has mapped this flaw to it yet, so the steps below are our prediction from what the record says the flaw allows. They are not MITRE's, the vendor's or CISA's, and an attacker may do other things.
| The step, in plain words | Stage of an attack | Why we think so |
|---|---|---|
| Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190): Breaking in through a service that faces the internet, such as a web server, VPN or login page. | Initial Access: getting in | BIND is a public-facing DNS service reachable without authentication; a crafted TKEY query would likely be the entire attack, exploiting the parsing flaw directly over the network with no prior foothold required. |
| Endpoint Denial of Service (T1499): Crashing or overloading a single system or application. | Impact: causing damage or disruption | The flaw triggers a REQUIRE assertion failure that exits the named daemon, so the likely outcome is application-level service disruption rather than network-layer flooding — the service stops responding until restarted. |
How to use this: ask your IT provider which control or log would show each step, for example whether sign-in attempts from the internet are recorded. If nobody can answer, that is the gap to close first.
MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. Technique names are MITRE's.
The sources, in their words
CISA's catalogue entry:
ISC BIND contains a data processing errors vulnerability that could allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service via TKEY queries.
The CVE record, published by Mitre on 29 July 2015:
named in ISC BIND 9.x before 9.9.7-P2 and 9.10.x before 9.10.2-P3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (REQUIRE assertion failure and daemon exit) via TKEY queries.
The record gives no version ranges. Use the vendor's advisory for the affected versions.
CISA's required action:
Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes).
Check your own project
If you build software, you can compare what a project declares with this CVE from a terminal. The tool reads requirements files, package.json, Maven, Gradle, Cargo, CMake and Dockerfile files, runs nothing, and only the CVE id leaves your machine. Naming the CVEs needs no key.
lattice-scan project . --cve CVE-2015-5477Each row says in-range, outside-range, undetermined or lead, with the file and line. That is evidence about what a manifest declares, not about what runs, and a person decides. The verdicts, the CSV columns and a pipeline recipe are in the guide.
Check the servers you run
The same id can be checked against a host. Run this on the machine itself, not on the laptop that deploys to it: it reads installed packages (dpkg, rpm or apk), snaps, the hardware, the running container images with their operating system and packages, and the kernel version, compares them on the spot, and only the CVE ids leave the machine; the inventory stays on it, in ~/.lattice-scan. Naming the CVEs needs no key. Do it on each server after a deployment, and again when a new entry lands.
lattice-scan --cve CVE-2015-5477A match is a candidate for a person to confirm, not a finding. A distribution can fix a CVE under an unchanged version number, so a match is a candidate; on Debian-family hosts the report also shows whether the package's own changelog names the CVE. It reads the names of the running images, not what is inside them; for what an image declares, use the project check on its Dockerfile.
Guide: namiq.io/lattice/guides/choose-your-channel. MCP server (io.namiq/lattice in the MCP registry): namiq.io/lattice. Package: pypi.org/project/lattice-scan, or namiq.io/apt.
- Which way into Lattice fits your job →The command line, the Claude skill or the MCP server: what each needs, what works without a key and how to read the result.
- Lattice, the MCP server →The public graph the command reads, for AI agents over MCP.
- Install and connect →The signed apt repository, the fingerprint, and the connection commands for each client.
What we do not know yet
- Which BIND version is the first unaffected one: no vendor page could be read.
- Whether a workaround exists short of updating.
- What an attack looks like in logs or on the system.
- Whether embedded or vendor-packaged BIND builds are affected.
- We have not tested this against any environment. Versions and scores are as the sources state them and as at 6 November 2026; the vendor's advisory wins where it differs.
- The sections headed "The bottom line", "Does this apply to you?", "What it is", "Why it matters", "Exposure by situation", "Things people will get wrong", "Likely ATT&CK mapping", "How we would triage it" and "Send this to your IT provider" are our interpretation of the sources, not a statement by CISA or the vendor.
Sources
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue
- CVE record for CVE-2015-5477
- FIRST: Exploit Prediction Scoring System
- Reference in the CVE record: h20564.www2.hpe.com
- Reference in the CVE record: kb.juniper.net
- Reference in the CVE record: security.netapp.com
- Reference in the CVE record: kb.isc.org
- Reference in the CVE record: h20566.www2.hpe.com