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Ivanti Connect Secure, CVE-2026-111357: on CISA's exploited list

·8 min read

The bottom line

If you run Ivanti Connect Secure, act now: CISA's deadline is 2 November 2026. First find out which version you run, then ask for the patch Ivanti published on 29 October 2026. If you do not run this appliance, you can stop reading.
Cover page of Ivanti Connect Secure, CVE-2026-111357: on CISA's exploited listFree analysis report · 9 pagesIvanti Connect Secure, CVE-2026-111357: on CISA's exploited listThe same note as a document you can keep or forward: what the sources say, who is affected, and what to do first.Download the analysis report →

At a glance

FactDetail
ProductIvanti Connect Secure (CVE-2026-111357)
SeverityHigh: 7 (CVSS 3.1)
CISAOn its exploited list since 30 October 2026. Deadline for US federal agencies: 2 November 2026.
Chance of exploitation (EPSS)0.01, the estimated chance in the next 30 days, as at 5 November 2026
Ransomware useNot recorded by CISA. That is not the same as none.
Fixed inNo source we read names a fixed version
Who looks firstAnyone running Ivanti Connect Secure VPN, especially 22.8R2.4, the only version the record lists as affected. Volexity found a fully patched 22.8R2.4 appliance compromised.

Does this apply to you?

Answer in order. Stop at the first no.
QuestionIf noIf yes
Do you run Ivanti Connect Secure?Nothing to do for this CVE.Check the version (next question).
Is the appliance on version 22.8R2.4?Ask Ivanti in writing whether your version is affected.Install the patch Ivanti published on 29 October 2026.
Can the appliance be reached from the internet?Lower exposure, but still patch and check for compromise.Treat as urgent and check for signs of compromise.

What it is

An attacker who is already logged in to the appliance can gain root, because the dsinvoked broker trusts DSCache configuration data it should not, the record says. Volexity reports it was the last step of a chain that began without a login.

Why it matters

Our reading is that the 'logged in' condition gives little comfort. Volexity says this flaw was the last step after an authentication bypass and a code execution flaw (CVE-2026-104935), which together gave root without a login. Volexity also says the actor went after Active Directory credentials, LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys, and deleted evidence from logs. A VPN appliance sits in a trusted place on the network, so root on it is a foothold for everything behind it.

What the vendor's advisory says

We read one page on www.volexity.com. In short:

  • Volexity says Ivanti published a patch for this flaw on 29 October 2026 and points to Ivanti's advisory. Our sources do not give the fixed version number.
  • Volexity describes a chain of three flaws: an authentication bypass in welcome.cgi, a file write flaw in wu.cgi, and this privilege escalation.
  • Volexity ties the authentication bypass and code execution flaws to CVE-2026-104935. CISA says this flaw can also be chained with CVE-2026-118527, which our sources do not describe.
  • Volexity says Ivanti published an advisory with upgrade instructions for the chain, and that signs such as lateral movement from the appliance call for forensic investigation.

Exposure by situation

These priorities are our judgement from what the sources say about who can use the flaw and how. They are not vendor ratings.

Where you stand, and how soon
Your situationPriorityTimeframe
Internet-facing appliance on 22.8R2.4Highwithin CISA's window
Appliance on 22.8R2.4 reachable only from the internal networkMediumthis week
Patched since 29 October 2026 but exposed while on 22.8R2.4Mediumthis week, check for compromise
Another Connect Secure version, not listed as affectedLowwhen Ivanti confirms in writing
No Ivanti Connect Secure in the estateNonenone for this CVE

Things people will get wrong

  • "It needs a login, so it is low risk." CISA says the attacker is authenticated, but Volexity says it was chained with an authentication bypass to give unauthenticated root.
  • "We were fully patched, so we are fine." Volexity found a fully patched 22.8R2.4 appliance (Build 19097) compromised in early October 2026. The patch came on 29 October 2026.
  • "No web shell was found, so nothing happened." Volexity says no backdoor or web shell was left, commands travelled in ordinary HTTPS requests, and the actor deleted evidence from logs.

The wording includes conditions the score may not show: the attacker must be logged in. Read the record before you decide it does not apply to you.

How we would triage it

This is our judgement.

Step 1: Find the versions you run

  • Check the version of each Connect Secure appliance in its admin console. Only 22.8R2.4 is listed as affected.
  • If you do not manage it yourself, ask whoever does.

Step 2: Read the vendor advisory for mitigations

  • Volexity says Ivanti's advisory has upgrade instructions. Read it for any mitigation to apply before you can patch.

Step 3: Patch the appliance

  • Apply the patch Ivanti published on 29 October 2026.
  • Our sources do not name the fixed version, so ask for the resulting version number in writing.

Step 4: Check for signs of compromise

  • The actor deleted evidence from debug and audit logs, so an empty log is not proof of safety.
  • Volexity advises forensic investigation where there are signs such as lateral movement from the appliance.

To close it, read the version from the product itself, not from an old inventory, and save the output with the date. If you cannot update today, write down who owns it, the new date, and what limits exposure until then. CISA's wording adds that you should stop using the product if no mitigation is available.

Send this to your IT provider

Copy it, change the names and dates, and send it. It is a draft for you to check, not a template tested with any provider.

Hello, we need to know whether we run Ivanti Connect Secure, and if so where and on which version. This concerns CVE-2026-111357, a privilege escalation to root that CISA lists as exploited. The record names version 22.8R2.4 as affected. Ivanti published a patch on 29 October 2026, and CISA's deadline is 2 November 2026. Please confirm in writing by the end of tomorrow the version we run, whether the patch is installed, and whether the appliance has been checked for signs of compromise. Thank you.

Signs it was used

An update closes the hole. It does not tell you whether someone used it first. CISA's required action points to its forensic triage requirements (BOD 26-04). Look for:

  • Signs of lateral movement starting from the VPN appliance, such as logins to internal systems from its address.
  • Unexpected access to Active Directory credentials, LAPS passwords or BitLocker recovery keys, which Volexity says the actor targeted.
  • Gaps or missing entries in the appliance's debug and audit logs, since the actor deleted evidence.

The weakness behind it

The record classes this as CWE-829.

Likely ATT&CK mapping

MITRE ATT&CK is a public catalogue of the steps attackers take, from getting in to causing damage. No source has mapped this flaw to it yet, so the steps below are our prediction from what the record says the flaw allows. They are not MITRE's, the vendor's or CISA's, and an attacker may do other things.

Steps an attacker would likely take with this flaw
The step, in plain wordsStage of an attackWhy we think so
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068): Using a flaw to gain higher rights than the account had, such as administrator or root.Privilege Escalation: gaining higher rightsThe record explicitly names this a privilege-escalation flaw requiring local authenticated access; exploiting missing authentication in a broker to reach root would typically map here.
Hijack Execution Flow (T1574): Making a program load the attacker's code instead of the real one.Persistence: staying inThe dsinvoked broker's unchecked trust of DSCache configuration data suggests an attacker could likely manipulate that data to influence the broker's execution path.

How to use this: ask your IT provider which control or log would show each step, for example whether sign-in attempts from the internet are recorded. If nobody can answer, that is the gap to close first.

MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. Technique names are MITRE's.

The sources, in their words

CISA's catalogue entry:

Ivanti Connect Secure contains a missing authentication for critical function vulnerability that could allow a local authenticated attacker to escalate their privileges. This vulnerability can be chained with CVE-2026-104935 and CVE-2026-118527.

The CVE record, published by Mitre on 15 October 2026:

Ivanti Connect Secure 22.8R2.4 mishandles the manner in which the dsinvoked broker trusts DSCache configuration data, leading to privilege escalation to root, as exploited in the wild in October 2026.

Versions of Ivanti Connect Secure the record lists as affected:

  • 22.8R2.4

CISA's required action:

Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions.

Check your own project

If you build software, you can compare what a project declares with this CVE from a terminal. The tool reads requirements files, package.json, Maven, Gradle, Cargo, CMake and Dockerfile files, runs nothing, and only the CVE id leaves your machine. Naming the CVEs needs no key.

lattice-scan project . --cve CVE-2026-111357

Each row says in-range, outside-range, undetermined or lead, with the file and line. That is evidence about what a manifest declares, not about what runs, and a person decides. The verdicts, the CSV columns and a pipeline recipe are in the guide.

Check the servers you run

The same id can be checked against a host. Run this on the machine itself, not on the laptop that deploys to it: it reads installed packages (dpkg, rpm or apk), snaps, the hardware, the running container images with their operating system and packages, and the kernel version, compares them on the spot, and only the CVE ids leave the machine; the inventory stays on it, in ~/.lattice-scan. Naming the CVEs needs no key. Do it on each server after a deployment, and again when a new entry lands.

lattice-scan --cve CVE-2026-111357

A match is a candidate for a person to confirm, not a finding. A distribution can fix a CVE under an unchanged version number, so a match is a candidate; on Debian-family hosts the report also shows whether the package's own changelog names the CVE. It reads the names of the running images, not what is inside them; for what an image declares, use the project check on its Dockerfile.

Guide: namiq.io/lattice/guides/choose-your-channel. MCP server (io.namiq/lattice in the MCP registry): namiq.io/lattice. Package: pypi.org/project/lattice-scan, or namiq.io/apt.

What we do not know yet

  • Which version number contains the fix; our sources do not name one.
  • Whether versions other than 22.8R2.4 are affected; the record lists only that one.
  • What CVE-2026-118527 is, beyond CISA's statement that it can be chained with this flaw.
  • Whether Ivanti offers a workaround short of patching.
  • We have not tested this against any environment. Versions and scores are as the sources state them and as at 5 November 2026; the vendor's advisory wins where it differs.
  • The sections headed "The bottom line", "Does this apply to you?", "What it is", "Why it matters", "Likely ATT&CK mapping", "Exposure by situation", "Things people will get wrong", "How we would triage it" and "Send this to your IT provider" are our interpretation of the sources, not a statement by CISA or the vendor.

Does this touch your business?

A new vulnerability is a question about what you run, who can reach it and what it would cost you. If you want a person to answer it for your own systems, start with your IT setup.

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