lxc incus, CVE-2026-130778: a new CVE scored 10
The bottom line
If you run Incus before 7.6.0 and its HTTPS listener can be reached by anyone you do not trust, act now: restrict that access to trusted hosts, then upgrade to 7.6.0. If you do not run Incus, or the listener is not enabled, you can stop reading.
Free analysis report · 10 pageslxc incus, CVE-2026-130778: a new CVE scored 10The same note as a document you can keep or forward: what the sources say, who is affected, and what to do first.Download the analysis report →At a glance
| Fact | Detail |
|---|---|
| Product | lxc incus (CVE-2026-130778) |
| Severity | Critical: 10 (CVSS 4.0) |
| Status | A new CVE record, published by VulnCheck on 18 November 2026. Not on CISA's list of exploited vulnerabilities when we read it on 19 November 2026, which means nothing public says yet that anyone is using it. |
| Fixed in | Incus 7.6.0 (the vendor's advisory, 29 October 2026; the record lists 7.6.0 as unaffected). |
| Who looks first | Anyone running Incus below 7.6.0 with the HTTPS listener reachable from other machines, above all clusters and hosts open to untrusted networks. |
Does this apply to you?
| Question | If no | If yes |
|---|---|---|
| Do you run Incus, or does an IT provider run it for you? | Nothing to do for this CVE. | Check the version (next question). |
| Is your Incus version older than 7.6.0? | 7.6.0 or later is not affected. Nothing more for this CVE. | You are in the affected range. Check who can reach the listener. |
| Is the HTTPS listener enabled on any Incus host? | The advisory describes the flaw in the HTTPS listener. Still plan the upgrade. | Check who can reach it (next question). |
| Can any machine you do not fully trust reach that listener over the network? | Lower urgency. Upgrade to 7.6.0 in your next patch cycle. | Restrict access now, then upgrade to 7.6.0 this week. |
What it is
A client that can reach the HTTPS listener can log in as any trusted client, metrics or server certificate by adding that certificate's public part to its own chain. It does not need the private key. This bypasses authorization entirely.
Why it matters
Our reading is that this is a full bypass, not a partial one. The advisory says server certificates are handed out in every TLS handshake, so an attacker needs no prior access to get one. On a cluster, another member's certificate gives internal cluster access. The advisory says the flaw has existed since the initial release, so every older install is in range.
What the vendor's advisory says
We read one page on github.com. In short:
- The vendor's advisory rates this Critical, 10.0, and says it has been present since the initial release.
- It says a client can also renew or delete any trust store entry through the self-service paths.
- It says the agent connection between the host and virtual machines is also affected.
- It says the unverified chain also reaches the authorization scriptlet, so a client can try to influence scriptlet-based decisions.
- Workaround per the advisory: restrict network access to the HTTPS listener to trusted hosts. It says there is no configuration-based workaround.
Exposure by situation
These priorities are our judgement from what the sources say about who can use the flaw and how. They are not vendor ratings.
| Your situation | Priority | Timeframe |
|---|---|---|
| Incus below 7.6.0 with the HTTPS listener reachable from untrusted networks | Medium | Restrict access today; upgrade this week |
| Incus cluster below 7.6.0, listener open to any host outside the cluster | Medium | Restrict access today; upgrade this week |
| Incus below 7.6.0, listener reachable only from a small set of trusted hosts | Medium | Upgrade this week |
| Incus below 7.6.0 with the HTTPS listener not enabled | Low | Next patch cycle |
| Incus 7.6.0 or later, or no Incus at all | None | None for this CVE |
Things people will get wrong
- "Clients need a valid certificate, so we are protected." The advisory says the handshake only proves the client holds the key for the first certificate. The rest of the chain is client controlled and was wrongly trusted.
- "The server's certificate is secret, so this is hard." The advisory says server certificates are returned by every TLS handshake, so no prior access is needed to obtain one.
- "We can switch off a setting to avoid it." The advisory says there is no configuration-based workaround. Restricting network access to the listener is the only mitigation it gives.
How we would triage it
This is our judgement.
The commands only read: they print a version or list what is installed. They come from general knowledge of this kind of product, not from the sources, so check them against the vendor's page before you run them. Words in capitals are for you to fill in.
Step 1: Find the Incus versions you run
- List every host running Incus, including clusters, and note each version. Anything below 7.6.0 is in the affected range per the record.
incus versionStep 2: Reduce exposure to the HTTPS listener
- Limit network access to the listener to trusted hosts only. This is the vendor's stated workaround, and it is the only one.
- Check whether the listener is enabled at all and which addresses it uses.
Step 3: Upgrade to 7.6.0
- Move every host to 7.6.0, the version the advisory lists as patched. Do clusters as a whole, not one member.
Step 4: Confirm the fix and review trust
- Re-run the version check on each host and keep the output.
- Review the list of trusted certificates for entries you do not recognise.
To close it, read the version from the product itself, not from an old inventory, and save the output with the date. If you cannot update today, write down who owns it, the new date, and what limits exposure until then.
Send this to your IT provider
Copy it, change the names and dates, and send it. It is a draft for you to check, not a template tested with any provider.
Hello, we need to confirm our exposure to CVE-2026-130778 in Incus. Versions before 7.6.0 let a remote client log in as any trusted certificate. Please tell us whether we run Incus, on which hosts, and which version each is. Please also say whether the HTTPS listener is reachable from outside trusted hosts. The fixed version is 7.6.0. Please restrict listener access now and send us written confirmation of each host's version and the upgrade by a date you name.
The weakness behind it
The record classes this as CWE-287.
Likely ATT&CK mapping
MITRE ATT&CK is a public catalogue of the steps attackers take, from getting in to causing damage. No source has mapped this flaw to it yet, so the steps below are our prediction from what the record says the flaw allows. They are not MITRE's, the vendor's or CISA's, and an attacker may do other things.
| The step, in plain words | Stage of an attack | Why we think so |
|---|---|---|
| Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190): Breaking in through a service that faces the internet, such as a web server, VPN or login page. | Initial Access: getting in | The flaw is in a network listener and needs no privileges, so it would likely be used against an exposed Incus service. |
| Valid Accounts (T1078): Logging in with a real account the attacker should not have, so the activity looks like normal use. | Initial Access: getting in | The record says attackers authenticate as a trusted certificate, so they would likely act as a legitimate client or cluster member. |
| Account Manipulation (T1098): Changing an existing account, for example adding permissions or keys, to keep access. | Persistence: staying in | The record says attackers can modify trust store entries, which would typically let them keep access by altering who is trusted. |
How to use this: ask your IT provider which control or log would show each step, for example whether sign-in attempts from the internet are recorded. If nobody can answer, that is the gap to close first.
MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. Technique names are MITRE's.
The sources, in their words
The CVE record:
Incus before 7.6.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows remote attackers to authenticate as any trusted certificate by appending its public certificate to their presented TLS client chain. Attackers can append the server's or a cluster member's certificate to gain cluster-level access, bypass authorization, modify trust store entries, and influence scriptlet-based authorization decisions.
Versions of lxc incus the record lists as affected:
- all versions before 7.6.0
It lists these as unaffected:
- 7.6.0
Check your own project
If you build software, you can compare what a project declares with this CVE from a terminal. The tool reads requirements files, package.json, Maven, Gradle, Cargo, CMake and Dockerfile files, runs nothing, and only the CVE id leaves your machine. Naming the CVEs needs no key.
lattice-scan project . --cve CVE-2026-130778Each row says in-range, outside-range, undetermined or lead, with the file and line. That is evidence about what a manifest declares, not about what runs, and a person decides. The verdicts, the CSV columns and a pipeline recipe are in the guide.
Check the servers you run
The same id can be checked against a host. Run this on the machine itself, not on the laptop that deploys to it: it reads installed packages (dpkg, rpm or apk), snaps, the hardware (maker, model, firmware), the running container images with their operating system and packages, and the kernel version, compares them on the spot, and only the CVE ids leave the machine; the inventory stays on it, in ~/.lattice-scan. Naming the CVEs needs no key. Do it on each server after a deployment, and again when a new entry lands.
lattice-scan --cve CVE-2026-130778A match is a candidate for a person to confirm, not a finding. A distribution can fix a CVE under an unchanged version number, so a match is a candidate; on Debian-family hosts the report also shows whether the package's own changelog names the CVE. By default it opens the images your containers are running and reads their operating system and package list; a deep scan (--deep, a few minutes) opens every local image and the Python, Node, Java and Ruby packages inside them; for what an image declares, use the project check on its Dockerfile.
Guide: namiq.io/lattice/guides/choose-your-channel. MCP server (io.namiq/lattice in the MCP registry): namiq.io/lattice. Package: pypi.org/project/lattice-scan, or namiq.io/apt.
- Which way into Lattice fits your job →The command line, the Claude skill or the MCP server: what each needs, what works without a key and how to read the result.
- Lattice, the MCP server →The public graph the command reads, for AI agents over MCP.
- Install and connect →The signed apt repository, the fingerprint, and the connection commands for each client.
What we do not know yet
- Whether this flaw has been used in attacks; the sources do not say.
- Whether any release before 7.6.0 on an older branch has a separate fix; the sources name only 7.6.0.
- Whether a compromise leaves visible traces; the sources describe none.
- Exploitation is not recorded. That is not the same as none.
- This is a new record: scores, versions and wording can change in the first days, and they are as at 19 November 2026. We read the vendor pages listed under Sources; nothing here has been tested.
- The sections headed "The bottom line", "Does this apply to you?", "What it is", "Why it matters", "Exposure by situation", "Things people will get wrong", "Likely ATT&CK mapping", "How we would triage it" and "Send this to your IT provider" are our interpretation of the sources, not a statement by CISA or the vendor.