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morpheus65535 bazarr, CVE-2026-61826: a new CVE scored 10

·9 min read

The bottom line

If you run Bazarr and anyone untrusted can reach it, update to 1.5.7-beta.14 or a later release now. The record gives no deadline. First find out whether and where it runs; if you do not run Bazarr, you can stop reading.

At a glance

FactDetail
Productmorpheus65535 bazarr (CVE-2026-61826)
SeverityCritical: 10 (CVSS 3.1)
StatusA new CVE record, published by GitHub on 30 October 2026. Not on CISA's list of exploited vulnerabilities when we read it on 6 November 2026, which means nothing public says yet that anyone is using it.
Fixed in1.5.7-beta.14 (the record says versions before it are affected; no other fixed version is named)
Who looks firstAnyone running Bazarr, the subtitle companion to Sonarr and Radarr, on a version before the fix. Most exposed are installs reachable from the internet or from a network with untrusted users or devices.

Does this apply to you?

Answer in order. Stop at the first no.
QuestionIf noIf yes
Do you run Bazarr, on a server, a NAS or in a container?Nothing to do for this CVE.Check the version (next question).
Is your Bazarr version older than 1.5.7-beta.14?Nothing more to do for this CVE.Check who can reach it (next question).
Can anyone untrusted reach the Bazarr web interface, from the internet or the wider network?Lower priority: update at your next patch cycle.Restrict access today and update.

What it is

The record says Bazarr's Plex endpoints do not ask for an API key. Anyone who can reach the web interface can switch off its Plex link, store a key of their own choosing, or tie their own Plex account to your install, without logging in.

Why it matters

Our reading is that this gives an outsider control of Bazarr's Plex connection without needing an account. The score is 10, and the sources show network access, low complexity, no privileges and no user action. The record also says an account the attacker controls can be bound to the instance, so your install could end up tied to a Plex account you do not own. The sources do not say how far that reaches beyond Bazarr itself.

What the vendor's advisory says

We read two pages on github.com. In short:

  • The GitHub advisory page lists CWE-306 and CWE-918 as well as CWE-352; the record lists CWE-352 and CWE-862.
  • The advisory page gives the vector as network, low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction, changed scope, and high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability.
  • The advisory page credits ildkh as the finder and CyberKareem as the remediation verifier.
  • The text we have does not name other flaws fixed in the same release, and gives no workaround.

Exposure by situation

These priorities are our judgement from what the sources say about who can use the flaw and how. They are not vendor ratings.

Where you stand, and how soon
Your situationPriorityTimeframe
Version older than 1.5.7-beta.14, reachable from the internetMediumNow; restrict access today, then update
Older version, reachable only from a home or office network with other users or devicesMediumThis week
Older version, reachable only from one trusted machineLowNext patch cycle
Bazarr already at 1.5.7-beta.14 or later, or not run at allNoneNone for this CVE

Things people will get wrong

  • "It is not on the CISA list, so nobody is using it." The record is new and was not on CISA's list when read. That says CISA has not listed it, not that nobody is exploiting it.
  • "It only matters if we use Plex." The description says anonymous callers can reach these endpoints without a PIN, account or state precondition. The sources do not say Plex must be set up first.
  • "Bazarr needs an API key, so we are covered." The record says these Plex handlers omit the authentication check that normal APIs have, and no global hook makes up for it.

How we would triage it

This is our judgement.

The commands only read: they print a version or list what is installed. They come from general knowledge of this kind of product, not from the sources, so check them against the vendor's page before you run them. Words in capitals are for you to fill in.

Step 1: Find the versions you run

  • Find every Bazarr install, including containers, and note its version.
  • Anything older than 1.5.7-beta.14 is in range, per the record.
docker ps --format '{{.Names}} {{.Image}}' | grep -i bazarr
systemctl list-units --type=service | grep -i bazarr
ps aux | grep -i [b]azarr

Step 2: Reduce exposure until patched

  • Take Bazarr off the internet and limit it to trusted machines. The flaw needs no login, so a password on the interface is not the fix.
  • If you cannot patch today, ask your provider to restrict access in the meantime.

Step 3: Update Bazarr

  • Move to 1.5.7-beta.14 or later, the fixed version the record names.
  • Note that this is a beta release tag; ask your provider which release they will install.

Step 4: Check the result

  • Confirm the running version is 1.5.7-beta.14 or later.
  • Open the Plex settings in Bazarr and check the key, linked account and selected server are the ones you set.

To close it, read the version from the product itself, not from an old inventory, and save the output with the date. If you cannot update today, write down who owns it, the new date, and what limits exposure until then.

Send this to your IT provider

Copy it, change the names and dates, and send it. It is a draft for you to check, not a template tested with any provider.

Hello, we need to check our exposure to CVE-2026-61826 in Bazarr. Please tell us whether we run Bazarr, where, and which version. The record says versions before 1.5.7-beta.14 are affected and that the Plex endpoints can be used without logging in. If we are in range, please update to 1.5.7-beta.14 or later and restrict access until then. Please confirm the version and the fix to us in writing by the end of this week. Thank you.

The weakness behind it

The record classes this as CWE-352 and CWE-862.

Likely ATT&CK mapping

MITRE ATT&CK is a public catalogue of the steps attackers take, from getting in to causing damage. No source has mapped this flaw to it yet, so the steps below are our prediction from what the record says the flaw allows. They are not MITRE's, the vendor's or CISA's, and an attacker may do other things.

Steps an attacker would likely take with this flaw
The step, in plain wordsStage of an attackWhy we think so
Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190): Breaking in through a service that faces the internet, such as a web server, VPN or login page.Initial Access: getting inThe Plex API namespace omits @authenticate on its handlers, so any unauthenticated network caller can invoke the endpoints directly; this would typically classify as exploiting a public-facing web API.
Account Manipulation (T1098): Changing an existing account, for example adding permissions or keys, to keep access.Persistence: staying inPOST /api/plex/apikey would likely let an attacker overwrite the stored API key with one they control, binding their own credential without any prior account or state precondition.
Service Stop (T1489): Stopping a service so the business cannot use it.Impact: causing damage or disruptionPOST /api/plex/oauth/logout would likely clear stored Plex credentials and disable the integration, stopping the subtitle-fetching function the application provides.

How to use this: ask your IT provider which control or log would show each step, for example whether sign-in attempts from the internet are recorded. If nobody can answer, that is the gap to close first.

MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. Technique names are MITRE's.

The sources, in their words

The CVE record:

Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the `api_ns_plex` namespace in `bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py` omits `@authenticate` on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke `POST /api/plex/oauth/logout` to clear credentials and disable the integration, or `POST /api/plex/apikey` to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. `POST /api/plex/oauth/pin` and `GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/<pin_id>/check` additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account's token to the instance. …

Versions of morpheus65535 bazarr the record lists as affected:

  • < 1.5.7-beta.14

The record gives no version ranges. Use the vendor's advisory for the affected versions.

Check your own project

If you build software, you can compare what a project declares with this CVE from a terminal. The tool reads requirements files, package.json, Maven, Gradle, Cargo, CMake and Dockerfile files, runs nothing, and only the CVE id leaves your machine. Naming the CVEs needs no key.

lattice-scan project . --cve CVE-2026-61826

Each row says in-range, outside-range, undetermined or lead, with the file and line. That is evidence about what a manifest declares, not about what runs, and a person decides. The verdicts, the CSV columns and a pipeline recipe are in the guide.

Check the servers you run

The same id can be checked against a host. Run this on the machine itself, not on the laptop that deploys to it: it reads installed packages (dpkg, rpm or apk), snaps, the hardware, the running container images with their operating system and packages, and the kernel version, compares them on the spot, and only the CVE ids leave the machine; the inventory stays on it, in ~/.lattice-scan. Naming the CVEs needs no key. Do it on each server after a deployment, and again when a new entry lands.

lattice-scan --cve CVE-2026-61826

A match is a candidate for a person to confirm, not a finding. A distribution can fix a CVE under an unchanged version number, so a match is a candidate; on Debian-family hosts the report also shows whether the package's own changelog names the CVE. It reads the names of the running images, not what is inside them; for what an image declares, use the project check on its Dockerfile.

Guide: namiq.io/lattice/guides/choose-your-channel. MCP server (io.namiq/lattice in the MCP registry): namiq.io/lattice. Package: pypi.org/project/lattice-scan, or namiq.io/apt.

What we do not know yet

  • Whether anyone is exploiting this; the record is new and CISA had not listed it when read.
  • Whether there is a workaround short of updating; the text we have names none.
  • Whether Plex must be configured for an attacker to use the endpoints; the sources do not say.
  • What else is fixed in 1.5.7-beta.14; no release notes are in the sources.
  • Exploitation is not recorded. That is not the same as none.
  • This is a new record: scores, versions and wording can change in the first days, and they are as at 6 November 2026. We read the vendor pages listed under Sources; nothing here has been tested.
  • The sections headed "The bottom line", "Does this apply to you?", "What it is", "Why it matters", "Exposure by situation", "Things people will get wrong", "Likely ATT&CK mapping", "How we would triage it" and "Send this to your IT provider" are our interpretation of the sources, not a statement by CISA or the vendor.

Does this touch your business?

A new vulnerability is a question about what you run, who can reach it and what it would cost you. If you want a person to answer it for your own systems, start with your IT setup.

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