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socfortress CoPilot, CVE-2026-61738: a new CVE scored 10

·8 min read

The bottom line

If you run SOCFortress CoPilot below version 0.1.77, ask your IT provider this week to confirm the version and move to 0.1.77 or later. If you do not run CoPilot, you can stop reading.

At a glance

FactDetail
Productsocfortress CoPilot (CVE-2026-61738)
SeverityCritical: 10 (CVSS 3.1)
StatusA new CVE record, published by GitHub on 30 October 2026. Not on CISA's list of exploited vulnerabilities when we read it on 6 November 2026, which means nothing public says yet that anyone is using it.
Fixed in0.1.77, taken from the record's affected range (before 0.1.77). The sources give no release notes or fix date.
Who looks firstAnyone running SOCFortress CoPilot before 0.1.77, first those whose instance can be reached from the internet or by many staff. The record says admin and analyst users can reach the upload.

Does this apply to you?

Answer in order. Stop at the first no.
QuestionIf noIf yes
Do you run SOCFortress CoPilot?Nothing to do for this CVE.Check the version (next question).
Is your CoPilot version earlier than 0.1.77?Not affected by this record. Keep the version note.Check who can reach it (next question).
Can anyone outside a trusted network reach the CoPilot web interface or API?Still patch, but within your normal cycle.Restrict access now, then patch this week.

What it is

The Google Cloud report upload takes the file name from the request without cleaning it. A crafted name makes the server write the uploaded JSON outside the report folder, including into the application's own source folder, which can overwrite files on the host.

Why it matters

Our reading is that a file write outside the intended folder, in a backend the record says runs as root, is useful to an attacker for more than tampering with a report. Overwriting application files can change what the server runs. The record gives the score as 10 and says the written content must be valid Google Cloud report JSON, which limits what can be written but does not remove the risk.

Exposure by situation

These priorities are our judgement from what the sources say about who can use the flaw and how. They are not vendor ratings.

Where you stand, and how soon
Your situationPriorityTimeframe
CoPilot before 0.1.77 whose interface or API is reachable from the internetMediumThis week; restrict access first
CoPilot before 0.1.77 reachable only from an internal networkMediumThis week or the next patch cycle
CoPilot before 0.1.77 where only a few trusted admins hold accountsMediumNext patch cycle
CoPilot at 0.1.77 or laterLowConfirm the version in writing
You do not run CoPilotNoneNone for this CVE

Things people will get wrong

  • "It is not on CISA's list, so nobody is using it." The record is new. Not being listed means CISA does not list it yet, not that nobody exploits it.
  • "It needs an admin login, so we are safe." The description names admin and analyst users, but the score's own vector says no privileges are needed. The two disagree, so do not rely on the login.
  • "It only writes a JSON file, so the damage is small." The record says the write lands outside the report folder, including the application source folder, in a backend running as root. That can overwrite host files.

How we would triage it

This is our judgement.

The commands only read: they print a version or list what is installed. They come from general knowledge of this kind of product, not from the sources, so check them against the vendor's page before you run them. Words in capitals are for you to fill in.

Step 1: Find the version you run

  • Check whether CoPilot is installed and which version. The record treats anything before 0.1.77 as affected.
  • Note where it runs and who can reach it.
docker ps --format '{{.Names}} {{.Image}}'
docker images | grep -i copilot

Step 2: Reduce exposure

  • Limit access to the CoPilot interface and API to trusted networks until it is patched.
  • Review which admin and analyst accounts exist, since the record says they can reach the upload.

Step 3: Update to 0.1.77 or later

  • Move to 0.1.77 or later, the version after the affected range in the record.
  • Ask the vendor's release notes for any other changes in the same release.

Step 4: Check for signs of misuse

  • Look for uploads to the Google Cloud report route with unusual file names, and for application files changed recently.

To close it, read the version from the product itself, not from an old inventory, and save the output with the date. If you cannot update today, write down who owns it, the new date, and what limits exposure until then.

Send this to your IT provider

Copy it, change the names and dates, and send it. It is a draft for you to check, not a template tested with any provider.

Hello, we need to know whether we run SOCFortress CoPilot, and if so where and which version. CVE-2026-61738 affects versions before 0.1.77 and allows files to be written outside the intended folder through the Google Cloud report upload. Please tell us whether any instance is exposed to the internet, update to 0.1.77 or later, and confirm the installed version and the fix to us in writing by the end of next week. Thank you.

The weakness behind it

The record classes this as CWE-22 and CWE-73 and CWE-434.

Likely ATT&CK mapping

MITRE ATT&CK is a public catalogue of the steps attackers take, from getting in to causing damage. No source has mapped this flaw to it yet, so the steps below are our prediction from what the record says the flaw allows. They are not MITRE's, the vendor's or CISA's, and an attacker may do other things.

Steps an attacker would likely take with this flaw
The step, in plain wordsStage of an attackWhy we think so
Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190): Breaking in through a service that faces the internet, such as a web server, VPN or login page.Initial Access: getting inThe flaw sits in a network-reachable API endpoint with no user interaction required; path traversal and unrestricted upload weaknesses would likely let an attacker write arbitrary files directly through the web interface.
Hijack Execution Flow (T1574): Making a program load the attacker's code instead of the real one.Persistence: staying inThe researcher demonstrated writes into the application source directory; an attacker would likely overwrite application code to hijack the backend's execution flow, achieving persistence across restarts.
Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation (T1565.001): Changing stored data without permission.Impact: causing damage or disruptionArbitrary file writes outside the intended report directory would typically allow an attacker to manipulate stored data or configuration files, altering application behaviour or corrupting records.

How to use this: ask your IT provider which control or log would show each step, for example whether sign-in attempts from the internet are recorded. If nobody can answer, that is the gap to close first.

MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. Technique names are MITRE's.

The sources, in their words

The CVE record:

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.77, `POST /api/scoutsuite/generate-gcp-report` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/routes/scoutsuite.py` admits admin and analyst users and validates the uploaded content as `GCPScoutSuiteJSON`, but passes raw `file.filename` from the multipart header to `save_file_to_directory` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/services/scoutsuite.py`. The writer combines this filename with `scoutsuite-report` using `os.path.join` without sanitization or a resolved-path containment check. A traversal filename therefore writes the supplied JSON outside the intended report directory. …

Versions of socfortress CoPilot the record lists as affected:

  • < 0.1.77

The record gives no version ranges. Use the vendor's advisory for the affected versions.

Check your own project

If you build software, you can compare what a project declares with this CVE from a terminal. The tool reads requirements files, package.json, Maven, Gradle, Cargo, CMake and Dockerfile files, runs nothing, and only the CVE id leaves your machine. Naming the CVEs needs no key.

lattice-scan project . --cve CVE-2026-61738

Each row says in-range, outside-range, undetermined or lead, with the file and line. That is evidence about what a manifest declares, not about what runs, and a person decides. The verdicts, the CSV columns and a pipeline recipe are in the guide.

Check the servers you run

The same id can be checked against a host. Run this on the machine itself, not on the laptop that deploys to it: it reads installed packages (dpkg, rpm or apk), snaps, the hardware, the running container images with their operating system and packages, and the kernel version, compares them on the spot, and only the CVE ids leave the machine; the inventory stays on it, in ~/.lattice-scan. Naming the CVEs needs no key. Do it on each server after a deployment, and again when a new entry lands.

lattice-scan --cve CVE-2026-61738

A match is a candidate for a person to confirm, not a finding. A distribution can fix a CVE under an unchanged version number, so a match is a candidate; on Debian-family hosts the report also shows whether the package's own changelog names the CVE. It reads the names of the running images, not what is inside them; for what an image declares, use the project check on its Dockerfile.

Guide: namiq.io/lattice/guides/choose-your-channel. MCP server (io.namiq/lattice in the MCP registry): namiq.io/lattice. Package: pypi.org/project/lattice-scan, or namiq.io/apt.

What we do not know yet

  • Whether anyone is exploiting this; the record is new and CISA does not list it.
  • Whether a login is really needed: the description names admin and analyst users, the score says none.
  • The release date and notes for 0.1.77; the sources do not give them.
  • Whether a workaround exists short of updating.
  • Exploitation is not recorded. That is not the same as none.
  • This is a new record: scores, versions and wording can change in the first days, and they are as at 6 November 2026. We read the vendor pages listed under Sources; nothing here has been tested.
  • The sections headed "The bottom line", "Does this apply to you?", "What it is", "Why it matters", "Exposure by situation", "Things people will get wrong", "Likely ATT&CK mapping", "How we would triage it" and "Send this to your IT provider" are our interpretation of the sources, not a statement by CISA or the vendor.

Does this touch your business?

A new vulnerability is a question about what you run, who can reach it and what it would cost you. If you want a person to answer it for your own systems, start with your IT setup.

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